Dr. Hasan Yaser Malik
The recent decision by the Philippines and Japan to initiate formal negotiations on maritime boundary delimitation in waters east of Taiwan has attracted considerable international attention. While some reports have incorrectly referred to South Korea as a party to the negotiations, the latest developments primarily involve the Philippines and Japan, whose Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) overlap in areas governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The move represents another significant effort by regional states to clarify maritime boundaries through legal and diplomatic means rather than coercion.
At first glance, a maritime delimitation process in the Western Pacific may appear geographically distant from the Indian Ocean. However, the implications are far-reaching. Maritime boundary agreements establish precedents for the management of contested waters, resource sharing, navigation rights, and strategic competition. These issues are equally relevant to critical chokepoints such as the Bab-el-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial portion of global trade and energy supplies pass.
Under UNCLOS, coastal states are entitled to a territorial sea extending up to 12 nautical miles and an Exclusive Economic Zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. When maritime claims overlap, states are encouraged to negotiate equitable boundaries. The Philippines and Japan have stated that their negotiations will be conducted in accordance with international law, reflecting a broader trend among maritime nations to seek legal solutions to overlapping claims. Recent Chinese objections to these talks underscore the strategic significance of maritime delimitation in contemporary geopolitics.
The importance of maritime boundaries is not merely legal. Approximately 90 percent of global trade by volume is transported by sea, making freedom of navigation and maritime stability essential for the global economy. The Indo-Pacific region, stretching from East Asia to the western Indian Ocean, has become the principal theatre of twenty-first-century maritime competition. Consequently, developments in one part of the region often influence strategic calculations elsewhere.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Located between Iran and Oman, it serves as the primary gateway for oil exports from the Persian Gulf. According to energy market estimates, nearly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz every day. Any disruption to navigation in these waters can immediately affect global energy prices and economic stability.
Similarly, the Bab-el-Mandab Strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The waterway is only about 29 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and serves as a vital route linking Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. An estimated 10–12 per cent of global trade and a significant proportion of container traffic transit through this corridor annually. Recent security incidents involving commercial shipping in the Red Sea have highlighted the vulnerability of this strategic maritime passage.
The connection between East Asian maritime delimitation and these Indian Ocean chokepoints lies in the evolving concept of rules-based maritime governance. When states successfully negotiate maritime boundaries based on international law, they reinforce norms that contribute to predictability and stability in global waters. Conversely, unresolved disputes create opportunities for confrontation, militarization, and disruption of commercial shipping routes.
The Philippines-Japan initiative also reflects the growing emphasis on coalition-building among maritime democracies. Countries across the Indo-Pacific increasingly recognize that secure sea lanes are indispensable for economic growth. Japan depends heavily on energy imports passing through Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandab, while the Philippines relies on secure maritime trade routes for commerce and economic development. Their cooperation therefore has implications that extend beyond East Asia.
For India, the developments are particularly relevant. India’s strategic location places it at the centre of Indian Ocean maritime affairs. Nearly 95 percent of India’s trade by volume and approximately 70 percent by value moves through maritime routes. Any instability in Hormuz or Bab-el-Mandab directly affects India’s energy security and economic interests.
The broader lesson emerging from the Philippines-Japan delimitation initiative is that maritime disputes need not inevitably lead to conflict. Historical examples such as the Indonesia-Philippines EEZ Agreement demonstrate that even complex maritime disagreements can be resolved through sustained diplomacy and legal negotiation. Such agreements reduce uncertainty, facilitate resource management, and strengthen regional stability.
As geopolitical competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, maritime boundary agreements will become increasingly important instruments of strategic stability. Whether in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, or the Bab-el-Mandab, the central challenge remains the same: balancing national interests with the collective need for secure and open sea lanes.
In an era where maritime commerce forms the backbone of globalization, the significance of legal maritime delimitation extends far beyond national boundaries. The ongoing negotiations in East Asia may therefore serve as an important precedent for managing maritime competition elsewhere, including some of the world’s most strategically sensitive waterways in the Indian Ocean region.
The writer is associated with Maritime Centre of Excellence
