Qamar Bashir
Former United Nations weapons inspector and U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer Scott Ritter describes the outcome of the Iran War bluntly: “We lost. Game, set, match.” His conclusion is severe, but the strategic evidence gives it considerable weight. The United States has inflicted enormous physical damage on Iran, yet it has failed to translate destruction into political submission, without realizing that war is not ultimately measured by the number of targets destroyed. It is measured by whether political objectives are achieved. Judged by that standard, Washington has not defeated Iran.
Ritter’s second argument concerns the decline of America’s ground-war capacity. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States deployed nearly 700,000 service members to the Persian Gulf. That force was possible because America had spent decades preparing for a major European war. Large formations were stationed in Germany, equipped, trained and ready for rapid movement. Strategic airlift, sealift and pre-positioned equipment supported deployment on an extraordinary scale.
By 2003, the available force was smaller, but Washington could still assemble approximately 200,000 personnel for the invasion of Iraq. It benefited from months of planning, deployment rehearsals and uncontested access to Kuwaiti ports, bases and airfields. American forces built up beside Iraq without facing missiles capable of destroying ships, ports, warehouses or troop concentrations.
Iran presents the opposite environment. It is nearly four times the size of Iraq, with difficult mountains, deserts, crowded cities, underground facilities and a population exceeding 90 million. Unlike Saddam Hussein’s isolated Iraq, Iran possesses ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, naval mines, coastal defences and hardened command networks.
A ground invasion would require not merely landing troops, but protecting ports, airfields, fuel depots, ammunition warehouses, ships and supply convoys from continuous attack. The very concentration of forces necessary for invasion would create lucrative targets for Iran.
Ritter argues that occupying or forcibly disarming Iran could require between 800,000 and 1.2 million troops. Whether the exact number proved higher or lower, the central reality remains: today’s United States does not maintain a force prepared to generate, transport, protect and sustain an invasion of that magnitude.
For Ritter, this incapacity exposes the central illusion behind Washington’s threats. The United States continues to speak as though limitless military power remains available on command, but the trained formations, strategic lift, secure bases, protected shipping and industrial capacity required for another major ground war no longer exist in readily deployable form. In his blunt formulation, “the emperor is naked”: the appearance of unlimited American power remains, but the material capacity to impose unconditional surrender on Iran does not.
In earlier Gulf wars, American bases provided secure springboards for military power. Aircraft flew from protected runways, ships unloaded at safe ports and soldiers assembled without enemy interference. The Iran War reversed that relationship.
American facilities in Jordan and across the Gulf became targets for Iranian missiles and drones. Even when attacks were intercepted, the United States and its partners had to expend sophisticated missiles costing vastly more than the incoming weapons. Some strikes penetrated the defensive umbrella, exposing weaknesses in supposedly protected installations.
Bases intended to reassure Gulf governments consequently became magnets for retaliation. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates now face a difficult question: does hosting American forces guarantee their security, or does it place their ports, power stations, desalination plants, airports and commercial centres within Iran’s target structure?
Ritter’s warning to the Gulf monarchies follows logically. If Washington cannot defend its own facilities reliably, it cannot offer absolute protection to its hosts. Continued participation in an American campaign may expose those countries to destruction without delivering victory. Their long-term security may therefore depend less upon permanent confrontation and more upon reaching a regional accommodation with Iran.
Washington used the instrument in which it retains its greatest advantage: airpower. American aircraft and long-range weapons struck Iranian command centres, air defences, coastal surveillance systems, missile facilities and drone infrastructure. Yet Iran continued fighting.
The problem was not that American bombs lacked destructive force. The problem was that bombardment could not eliminate a dispersed military establishment embedded across a vast country. Destroyed launchers could be replaced, surviving missiles relocated and command responsibilities transferred.
At sea, Iran’s anti-ship missiles, drones and area-denial systems forced American commanders to consider the vulnerability of carriers, amphibious vessels and transport ships. Moving a large naval force close to Iran would place concentrated, expensive platforms within reach of comparatively inexpensive weapons.
Ritter argues that the United States cannot safely assemble the amphibious force required to seize Iran’s coast or control Hormuz. Ships carrying troops, vehicles and supplies would have to approach through waters covered by missiles, drones and mines. One successful strike could destroy not only a vessel but a substantial portion of the invasion force and its equipment.
Thus, America’s technological superiority has encountered an operational paradox: its most advanced platforms are too valuable, concentrated and vulnerable to risk casually against an adversary prepared for saturation warfare.
The conflict has also exposed the limits of the American defence-industrial base. Modern wars consume precision weapons and missile interceptors much faster than factories replace them.
Recent fighting reportedly reduced U.S. Patriot inventories by approximately 65 percent and THAAD stocks by about 38 percent. The Pentagon disputes claims that it lacks sufficient ammunition, but it has requested $67 billion to replenish military supplies.
The Army’s new Patriot contract may be worth up to $58.6 billion, yet expanded production will take years rather than weeks. Lockheed Martin plans to triple output by 2030—not in time to transform the immediate battlefield.
As Ritter observes, there is no military “cheat code.” Money appropriated today cannot instantly produce trained soldiers, ships, interceptors or precision missiles. Industrial capacity, skilled workers, supply chains and testing facilities must be developed over time.
Israel helped initiate the confrontation but has increasingly shifted its costs and risks onto Washington. The United States now finds itself directly fighting Iran, defending regional bases, protecting Israel, replenishing depleted interceptors and attempting to reopen Hormuz.
This is the strategic trap Ritter identifies. Israel’s confrontation became America’s war, while Israel retained the protection of the United States without possessing the capacity to end the conflict independently.
Washington must now decide whether continuing the war serves American interests or merely deepens a commitment from which Israel benefits while American troops, arsenals, finances and international credibility bear the strain.
The United States has not ceased to be a major military power, but power without an achievable objective becomes self-destructive. It cannot invade Iran at an acceptable cost, cannot bomb it into surrender, cannot guarantee the safety of every regional base and cannot immediately replace the weapons being consumed. Iran, despite sanctions and destruction, remains standing and still controls the principal strategic question: Hormuz.
The rational course is therefore to end the war, withdraw exposed forces, restore diplomacy and allow Gulf governments to establish a security relationship with Iran based on coexistence rather than permanent American militarization. Such a settlement would also compel Israel to seek security through accommodation with its neighbours instead of relying indefinitely on U.S. power.
Ritter’s verdict is uncomfortable but clear: Washington played its strongest military cards and failed to impose its political will. Iran has exposed the widening gap between the image of unlimited American power and the force Washington can actually mobilize and sustain against a determined adversary. The emperor is naked, and continuing to wager after the strategic hand has been lost will not conceal that reality—it will only increase the price. Game, set, match.
The writer is Press Secretary to the President (Rtd),Former Press Minister, Embassy of Pakistan to France,Former Press Attaché to Malaysia and Former MD, SRBC. He is living inMichigan, USA.
