Mehr un Nisa
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi concluded his high-profile visit to Israel shortly before the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran, the optics were impossible to ignore. Diplomacy often operates in the realm of symbolism, but in West Asia, where timing is inseparable from intent, symbolism can harden into strategy. The visit, the ceremonial warmth extended by Benjamin Netanyahu and the subsequent regional escalation together form a sequence that raises uncomfortable but necessary questions about India’s evolving posture in one of the world’s most combustible theatres.
India and Israel elevated their relationship to a “Special Strategic Partnership,” signing 17 agreements spanning defence, technology, water management and innovation. While bilateral cooperation between New Delhi and Tel Aviv is not new, defence ties date back to the 1990s and deepened significantly after the 1999 Kargil conflict, the current phase represents institutional consolidation. Israel has consistently ranked among India’s top arms suppliers, providing advanced surveillance systems, UAVs, missile defence platforms such as the Barak series and joint research initiatives. The new focus on Critical and Emerging Technologies, led by their respective National Security Advisers, signals a long-term integration of defence-industrial ecosystems. Yet partnerships are not judged only by content, but by context.
The decision of Netanyahu to personally receive Modi at Ben-Gurion Airport alongside his wife, an honour previously reserved for select leaders including Donald Trump, was rich in political theatre. In Israeli diplomatic culture, such gestures communicate endorsement and hierarchy. At a moment when Israel faces intense scrutiny over its prolonged military campaign in Gaza, Modi’s visit carried the implicit weight of political validation. Diplomats across West Asia have interpreted the trip as contributing to Netanyahu’s efforts to mitigate diplomatic isolation.
India’s balancing rhetoric during the visit, supporting Israel’s security concerns while reiterating the need for a just resolution of the Palestinian issue, reflects New Delhi’s longstanding approach. In his address to the Knesset, Modi reiterated support for peace initiatives and acknowledged Palestinian aspirations. On paper, this resembles India’s traditional multi-alignment: solidarity with Israel’s security, rhetorical affirmation of Palestine’s statehood and avoidance of explicit alignment in regional rivalries. But timing disrupted that equilibrium.
Two days after the partnership was elevated, the United States and Israel initiated strikes on Iranian targets. While there is no public evidence linking India to operational decisions, diplomacy is rarely assessed in legalistic terms. It is assessed politically. The proximity of the visit to the strike window amplified perceptions, fairly or unfairly, that India had chosen to stand visibly alongside Israel at a moment of military escalation. The fact that the strikes were reportedly planned months further complicates the optics: Modi’s departure from Israel coincided with a pre-calculated strategic inflection point.
India’s silence on the attack against Iran has deepened scrutiny. Tehran is not a peripheral partner. India has invested heavily in the Chabahar port project, designed to provide access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. Iran has historically supplied India with crude oil and remains critical to regional connectivity strategies. Alienating Tehran carries tangible economic and strategic costs, particularly given India’s energy security imperatives and diaspora presence across the Gulf.
The broader architecture of India’s West Asia policy has traditionally rested on three pillars: energy security, diaspora welfare and strategic autonomy. Nearly nine million Indians reside in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Remittances from the region contribute tens of billions of dollars annually to India’s economy. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates rank among India’s key energy partners and major investment sources. Any perception that India is drifting into an overt anti-Iran or anti-Sunni/Shia axis risks unsettling this delicate ecosystem.
Netanyahu’s articulation of a “hexagon” alignment, reportedly involving India, Greece, Cyprus and others alongside the existing I2U2 framework (India, Israel, United States, UAE) situates India within a network increasingly framed in strategic-ideological terms. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced during the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi, reflects India’s ambition to become a connective power linking Europe and Asia through rail, port and logistics integration. IMEC traverses India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Greece. Its viability, however, depends on regional stability. Escalation with Iran jeopardises that stability.
This is where the persuasive concern emerges: India’s long-cherished doctrine of strategic autonomy risks erosion not through formal alliances, but through accumulated perception shifts.
Contrast this moment with 1979. When Chinese forces attacked Vietnam during his visit to Beijing, then External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee cut short his trip, signalling India’s disapproval. The message was unmistakable: India would not lend symbolic cover to military aggression during high-level diplomacy. Today, India’s refusal to publicly criticise the Iran strikes projects a different posture, one of calibrated silence.
Supporters of Modi’s approach argue that India cannot afford to antagonise Israel or the United States. Defence cooperation with Israel enhances India’s military modernisation. The United States remains central to India’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its balancing vis-à-vis China. Moreover, India’s engagement with Israel has produced tangible outcomes in agriculture, water desalination, cybersecurity and innovation ecosystems. From this perspective, criticism of Israel would undermine hard-earned strategic dividends.
However, international relations theory reminds us that credibility is cumulative. If India is perceived as selectively vocal, condemning some acts of force while overlooking others, its claim to normative leadership in the Global South weakens. India has historically championed non-alignment, decolonisation and respect for sovereignty. Remaining silent on a high-profile strike against a sovereign state risks diluting that normative capital.
Furthermore, escalation between Israel and Iran risks drawing the broader Gulf into confrontation. Even limited exchanges can disrupt shipping lanes, energy markets and diaspora security. India imports a significant portion of its oil from West Asia. A regional conflagration would directly impact inflation, fiscal stability and domestic political calculations in New Delhi.
There is also the Palestinian dimension. India once stood firmly with Palestine in multilateral forums, reflecting both ideological alignment and domestic consensus. While New Delhi has recalibrated since establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992, it has sought to preserve moral consistency by endorsing a two-state solution. A visible embrace of Israel during wartime, without parallel gestures toward Ramallah, undermines that balancing narrative.
The question, therefore, is not whether India should engage Israel. It should. Nor is it whether Israel is a valuable strategic partner. It is. The question is whether the sequencing and signalling of engagement adequately account for regional sensitivities and long-term strategic interests.
Multi-alignment is sustainable only if it is perceived as genuine by all sides. If India’s posture begins to resemble bloc alignment, even informally, the costs of hedging will rise. Tehran may recalibrate. Gulf monarchies may reassess expectations. China and Russia could exploit perceived inconsistencies to question India’s independent credentials in multilateral forums.
In a volatile West Asia, optics are not superficial; they are structural. The visit to Israel may have been intended as a reaffirmation of partnership and technological ambition. Yet, in the shadow of imminent military escalation, it also became a geopolitical signal.
India stands at a crossroads. It can reaffirm its tradition of principled autonomy, engaging all sides while clearly articulating its opposition to destabilising force, or it can drift, incrementally, into an axis defined more by strategic expediency than balanced statecraft. The choice will shape not only India’s West Asia policy, but its global identity as a rising power that claims to speak for stability, sovereignty and the Global South. In geopolitics, timing is policy.
The author is the head of the research and human rights department of Kashmir Institute of International Relations (KIIR). She can be reached at : [email protected] and on X @MHHRsays
