The recent initiation of dialogue between PTI and the broader political spectrum marks a pivotal and positive step toward resolving political conflicts through democratic means. This development reflects a notable shift in PTI’s earlier stance of isolating itself from political actors it had dismissed as powerless, illegitimate, and lacking public mandate. Previously, PTI sought engagement exclusively with the establishment, which it deemed the true power holder, undermining the democratic principle that governance should be conducted through civilian institutions and elected representatives. This shift suggests that PTI may have received assurances from the establishment to support its demands if it engages with civilian political forces, signaling a strategic recalibration.
PTI’s demands in these negotiations can be divided into short-term and long-term goals. In the immediate term, PTI is likely to prioritize the release of its leader, Imran Khan, and detained political activists, as well as the restoration of the February 8 election mandate, which it views as critical to reclaiming governance in the center and Punjab.
However, PTI’s far-sighted demands focus on systemic reforms to strengthen democratic governance, reduce military interference in civilian affairs, and establish a stable governance framework. Key reforms include an independent Election Commission with biometric voter verification, judicial independence through transparent appointments, and institutional accountability. PTI also seeks to redefine civil-military relations by confining the military to defense roles, removing military officers from civilian positions, and introducing parliamentary oversight of defense budgets. Additionally, fostering national unity through inclusivity, empowering marginalized communities, and addressing socio-economic issues like poverty, healthcare, and education forms a cornerstone of PTI’s vision.
Rather than seeking short-term concessions, PTI should demand the reversal of recent constitutional amendments and legislative changes enacted by the incumbent government. These amendments have drastically altered the balance of power, weakening the judiciary, reducing parliamentary authority, and enhancing military influence. For instance, the 26th Constitutional Amendment has increased parliamentary involvement in judicial appointments and altered the process of selecting the Chief Justice, replacing the seniority-based system with parliamentary discretion—a move widely criticized for undermining judicial independence. Similarly, amendments to the Pakistan Army Act extended the tenures of military chiefs, consolidating their authority, while legislative measures granted the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) unprecedented powers of communication interception, raising concerns about privacy and civil liberties. Additionally, the government’s perceived non-compliance with Supreme Court orders, including those opposing the trial of civilians in military courts, has further eroded democratic principles and institutional balance.
These recommendations align with a concept paper I presented to PTI leadership in May 2024, emphasizing the importance of resolving political issues on political platforms rather than relying on the establishment. The paper highlighted that PTI’s refusal to engage with other political parties weakened its ability to build consensus on national issues and reinforced a narrative that the military remains the ultimate arbiter of power. It urged PTI to shift from isolationist rhetoric to meaningful dialogue, recognizing that democratic governance rests on the strength of civilian institutions and collaboration among elected representatives.
However, the feasibility of these negotiations remains uncertain. If frivolous cases against PTI leadership and workers are withdrawn under due process, PTI would quickly regain its footing and mobilize its supporters, potentially crippling the government through street agitation. If the establishment remains neutral, the government might not last more than a few months. Similarly, conceding to PTI’s demand to restore the “stolen mandate” of the February 8 elections would immediately delegitimize the government, leading to its collapse. Furthermore, undoing constitutional and legislative amendments would strip the military and ISI of their enhanced powers, restore election tribunals, eliminate military courts, and reinstate the judiciary’s full authority. These changes would likely result in the government’s swift disintegration, as PTI’s restored position would render it ungovernable.
Under the current circumstances, the government is likely to offer limited and calculated concessions to PTI, aimed at placating the opposition without jeopardizing its own hold on power or antagonizing the establishment. These concessions may include the partial withdrawal of minor or frivolous cases against PTI leaders, the selective release of detained workers, and symbolic gestures reaffirming democratic principles without enacting meaningful reforms. Discussions on electoral reforms, such as biometric voter verification or improved oversight, might be entertained, but any implementation would likely be delayed. The government is unlikely to address demands that threaten its legitimacy, such as restoring the February 8 election mandate or reversing constitutional amendments that enhance establishment powers. These constraints highlight the delicate balance the government must maintain—appearing conciliatory enough to prevent unrest while avoiding concessions that could undermine its authority or provoke institutional backlash. As a result, any offered concessions are expected to be superficial, prolonging political instability without addressing PTI’s core grievances.
Interestingly, any or all concessions would not significantly dent the deeply entrenched establishment, which has consolidated unprecedented power since February 8. For the establishment, shifting support between political parties is routine. Regardless of the ruling party, the establishment’s authority remains unassailable. If it chooses to remove the incumbent government, it will do so decisively, installing a new party of choice and supporting it until it falls out of favor. This cyclical process underscores the disposable nature of civilian governments and the enduring dominance of the establishment in Pakistan’s power dynamics. Without addressing this imbalance, any progress toward genuine democratic governance will remain illusory.
Writer is Press Secretary to the President(Rtd), Former Press Minister at Embassy of Pakistan to France and Former MD, SRBC. He is living in Macomb, Detroit, Michigan
