Samir Humbatov
Beginning on June 30, 2025, the crime committed by the armed OMON units—subordinate to the internal affairs bodies of the Russian Federation—against Azerbaijanis in the city of Yekaterinburg, and the resulting torture and murder of Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov, Azerbaijani by ethnicity and citizens of both Russia and Azerbaijan, is not merely an isolated incident. Rather, it reflects the deepening of ethnic and national discrimination within Russia and the further entrenchment of Russian chauvinistic policies.
It must also be emphasized that this incident in Yekaterinburg is not unique. Law enforcement authorities of the Russian Federation have also carried out similar OMON raids on Azerbaijani homes in other cities such as Voronezh and Saint Petersburg. Azerbaijanis have been subjected to torture, and in some cases, despite their Russian citizenship, were deported to Azerbaijan. The number of such cases is so high that it cannot be precisely quantified.
Naturally, this chain of events gives rise to a number of key observations. First and foremost, it should be noted that these repressive policies are not directed exclusively at Azerbaijanis. The frequency of similar incidents targeting Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, and other migrant groups clearly demonstrates that the chauvinistic ideology that has long existed in Russia is now positioned at the core of official state policy.
Several reasons can be identified behind Russia’s increasingly hostile stance toward migrants.
First, the ongoing war of aggression that Russia has been waging in Ukraine for over three years has failed to bring about any positive outcomes for Moscow. On the contrary, Russia is estimated to have lost nearly one million soldiers, along with significant quantities of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment. The result has been a serious economic downturn—one now openly acknowledged by Russian citizens themselves.
Second, Russia’s descent from the status of a global power to that of a regional actor is a significant factor. An analysis of Russia’s geopolitical losses over the past five years makes this decline evident. For example, the humiliating defeat of Armenia in the 44-day Second Karabakh War, which began on September 27, 2020, dealt a major blow to Russia’s dominant position in the South Caucasus. In the aftermath, the regional balance of power was redefined, especially with the rise of Turkey’s influence. A similar pattern can be observed in Syria and Libya. The December 9, 2024 coup in Syria, which resulted in the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad government, led to Russia’s withdrawal and the de facto transfer of its influence in Syria to Turkey—another significant setback for Moscow.
Third, Azerbaijan’s post-war transition to a broader and more multi-vector foreign policy, the consolidation of its position as a regional actor, and its assertive and independent foreign policy on the global stage are developments that have become increasingly troubling for the Kremlin.
These and other contributing factors have compelled Russia to behave more aggressively toward neighboring and regional states, interfere in their domestic affairs, and orchestrate various provocations. Armenia’s shift away from Russia’s geopolitical orbit and toward the West, and Azerbaijan’s transition to an independent and multidimensional foreign policy, have clearly not been welcomed in Moscow. As a result, Russia has resorted to provocation.
Naturally, these developments raise a number of pressing questions. One of the most critical is: What does Russia stand to gain—or lose—from this aggressive policy path?
It can be stated with certainty that unlike in the 19th or 20th centuries, we now live in the 21st century, where such behavior is not only condemned by the international community but also provokes serious repercussions. If these reactions materialize in the form of sanctions and diplomatic isolation, it underscores the gravity of the situation for Russia.
Therefore, under current circumstances, Russia must adhere to the terms of the Declaration on Allied Interaction signed with Azerbaijan on February 22, 2022, and make meaningful adjustments to its foreign policy strategy. Otherwise, already facing growing isolation from the international community since 2022, Russia may find itself in an even deeper state of diplomatic and economic exclusion—potentially accelerating its collapse.
Taking into account that Azerbaijan and Turkey have established top-level strategic alliance relations through the Shusha Declaration since 2021, Russia would be wise to reassess its approach with greater caution.
Finally, one of the most important factors that Russia must consider is the leadership of President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan. Not only is President Aliyev a key figure in the South Caucasus, but he is also recognized and respected in the global political arena, while simultaneously maintaining an uncontested leadership status within Azerbaijan itself.
Writer is Political Analyst and Director of the Center for International Relations and Diplomacy Studies
